Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
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Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
Wow—a truly excellent discussion, all around. Previous Post Survey Says. I think the science is likely necessary, not sufficient, for addressing the philosophical questions. I suspect that proponents of RV will be puzzled by your worry.
But what does that look like?
Or they might be ignorant of the danger, but nevertheless fully aware of many other interesting and important things about tigers. Dan, thanks for posting the link.
However, I have a concern about the lack of clear implications for psycho semantics of a theory of rat intentionality. Thanks for the response, Dan!
The stuff about following Foror and Dennett will, of course, be controversial.
I have no idea how to solve it. Whereas the growing consensus among teleo folks seems to be that you need to consider both sides.
The stuff is likely indispensable. One thing might be non-naturalism about mental content, as Adam notes. See what Dan Ryder said above. Suppose that, todor his unusual ignorance, this guy nevertheless knows a great deal about tiger fur and its various uses in exotic cultures. Myself, my main concern is with human mental representation, which I attacked via the neuroscientific route.
When discussing birdsong or beedance, they should matter less because we can do behavioral experiments: For my part, I side prima facie with Eric. A final somewhat unrelated concern that philosophers specifically should probably worry about: I completely agree with the above. Or is it that kiwi that represent the snorf or red?
Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
Psychosematics could help it allocate attentional resources if looking for a rabbit that trips. When precision matters, we calibrate with one another. If the food is moved by about an inch while the wasp is in the nest, the wasp will move the food back to its original spot and repeat the nest-check subroutine. Fodor – – In William G.
Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics
Philosophical Review, 3: I doubt that rats are more like wasps than like plovers. But why do we think that the content is more precise than what is required to play the right perceptual role JNDs? This is evident when we consider our own, human, representational states. Some good partial answers may have been given to important questions—but not the exact questions that Dretske and Fodor were trying to answer. Are there published papers about rats exhibiting such rational psychosemanticx
I look forward to giving the paper the thorough read it deserves. There are vast numbers of local fitness enhancing states of affairs presence of food, presence of mate, presence of predator etc. Well, I think spychosemantics need to distinguish between a research program having a serious theoretical problem with a research program having lots of folks working on it.